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The Case for Divestiture to Private Plaintiffs
Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(a)
DAVID P. CURNOW*
HOWARD B. MATLOFF**
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical situation. An individual
who was the chief executive officer and sole shareholder of a corpo-
ration which offered various types of investments to the public en-
gaged in a scheme to defraud. The monies which were collected
from the investors were used, in part, to make investments on behalf
of the investors; in part to create an aura of respectability for the
corporation by the purchase of various buildings and the leasing of
automobiles; in part, to pay back previous investors; and through
various diversions, to purchase for the individual various assets
such as houses, boats, cars, airplanes, stock investments, other busi-
nesses, diamonds, and the like. When the investment scheme col-
lapsed, various investors complained to the State Attorney
General's Office and the United States Attorney, and those prose-
cuting agencies decided to pursue a criminal case against the indi-
vidual. The private investors, however, were left with the prospect
of having to pursue the individual in a private lawsuit to recover
their losses. The investors filed the standard civil lawsuit alleging
violations of the various securities laws as well as various statutory
and common law theories of fraud.' The investors also consider
filing a lawsuit under Title 18 U.S.C., section 1961, and following
(commonly referred to as the "RICO" statute), to seek the treble
damages provided for under 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c). 2
* Partner, Jennings, Engstrand & Henrikson, San Diego, California; B.A., Uni-
versity of Redlands, 1964; J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1967;
Former Assistant United States Attorney.
** Mr. Matloff is in private legal practice in San Diego, California; B.A., Colum-
bia University, 1969; J.D., Harvard University, Felix Frankfurter Scholar, 1972; For-
mer Assistant United States Attorney; Mr. Matloff has also served as Special Assistant
for Policy to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the
United States Department of Justice.
1. Generally, suits are brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the Securities Act of 1933, as well as common law breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of contract and fraud theories. Moreover, suits are brought pursuant to state securities
laws ("blue sky laws").
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
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The question which can be legitimately raised is whether under
18 U.S.C. section 1964(a), the same investors are entitled to a judi-
cial declaration that the individual must divest himself of all of his
assets which were obtained through the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity prohibited by the RICO statute, and further order that he
turn over the assets to the investors for liquidation and
distribution.3
In addition to the damage remedies which are provided for under
18 U.S.C. section 1964(c), a strong argument can be made for the
invocation of various equitable remedies under 18 U.S.C. section
1964(a), and, in particular, the equitable remedy of divestiture
which it specifically calls for.4 Section 1964(a) does not by its terms
limit itself to actions which are brought by the United States. To
the contrary, that particular subsection states that the United States
courts can order divestiture; there is nothing in the subsection
which prohibits an individual from asking for divestiture; and there
is nothing in the subsection which states that only the United States
can ask for divestiture.5
To date, two cases have held that divestiture is not available to a
private plaintiff under 18 U.S.C. section 1964(a), Kaushal v. State
Bank of India6 and DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corporation.7 The
purpose of this Article is to state a case for divestiture for the pri-
vate plaintiff under 18 U.S.C. section 1964(a).
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Along with federal RICO, several states have enacted state "Little" RICO statutes. For
example, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41
(West 1982); as well as at least twenty other states.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restric-
tions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
4. Id.
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
6. The case of Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983),
has been discussed and rejected in Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Ind., 590 F.
Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa. 1984), wherein the district court held that the equitable remedies
of § 1964(a) were available to private plaintiffs. Divestiture was not specifically ad-
dressed by the court. See also AETNA Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp.
908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
7. 589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the past the word "divestiture" has been used synonomously
with "forfeiture."' 8 As will be fully explored later, the words should
probably not be used in the same sense.9
The forfeiture concept orginated both in Mosaic and Grecian
law. Under those two systems, if a thing, as opposed to a human
being, caused the death of a human, the thing causing the death
would be taken by the state and destroyed.10 In ancient Anglo com-
mon law, the doctrine of "deodand" developed where if any per-
sonal chattel, animate or inanimate, was the immediate instrument
causing the death of a human, it was forfeited to God through his
agent, the king, for sale. A distribution was then made in alms to
the poor." The Anglo common law forfeiture concept evolved to
the point that in the 1700's, conviction of a crime meant, in addition
to imprisonment, that the offender's real and personal property was
all forfeited to the king, no matter whether the property was used in
the illegal act or caused the illegal act to occur.12 In addition to
complete forfeiture, there was imposed upon the offender the "cor-
ruption of blood," which meant that all his heirs were cut off com-
pletely and could inherit nothing through the offender.13
Obviously, this forfeiture doctrine could be subject to abuse by
officials of the king, as the American colonists found out. Because
of their experience with the English kings and their forfeitures, the
framers of the Constitution enacted Article III, Section 3 of the
Constitution, and the First Congress in 1790 enacted what is now
18 U.S.C. section 3653.14 They read as follows: "The Congress
shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no At-
8. Divestiture is defined as following: "In anti-trust law, the order of court to a
defendant (e.g. corporation) to divest itself of property, securities or other assets."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 429 (5th ed. 1979). Forfeiture is defined as following:
"Something to which the right is lost by the commission of a crime or fault or the losing
of something by way of penalty. A deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence
of the nonperformance of some obligation or condition. Loss of some right or property
as a penalty for some illegal act. Loss of property or money because of breach of a legal
obligation. Id. at 584 (citation omitted).
9. See infra notes 10-42 and accompanying text.
10. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
11. Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 466, 249 S.W. 795, 797
(1923); Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219, 223, 51 S.E. 992, 995 (1905); Blakey, RICO's
Enforcement Provision: An Interpretative Analysis, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. RaV. 941, 949
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Blakey, An Interpretative Analysis].
12. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473 n.35 (1977); United
States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1345 n.84 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (1983).
13. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473 n.35 (1977).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1982). United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1345 n.84
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 959 n.23 (5th Cir. 1982). Both
of these cases discuss the relationship of the colonist's reaction to forfeitures and the
passage of the RICO legislation.
[Vol. 21
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tainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person Attained." 15 "No conviction
or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of
estate." 1
6
A reading of these two brief enactments would lead one to the
conclusion that forfeiture, as a sanction, was eliminated from Amer-
ican jurisprudence. Such is not the case because gradually, forfeit-
ures for specific acts and for specific things worked their way back
into the United States Code.17 Courts have noted that "contempo-
rary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of
property that might be used in the conduct of criminal enter-
prise."1 8 Prior to RICO, all of these forfeiture provisions were in
rem in nature.19
For the first time in American law, RICO changed the nature of
forfeitures in that the legislation called for in personam forfeitures. 20
This radical change was of concern to the Congress and prompted a
letter from then Assistant Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
explaining the reasons for the proposed change. 21 Basically, the
15. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982).
17. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979), reh'g denied,
672 F.2d 379, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). As was noted in the dissent in United
States v. Martino:
Although general forfeitures arg historically disfavored, Congress has fre-
quently used the one of specific f6rfeitures in combating illegal activities. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (forfeiture of property acquired in violation of antitrust
laws); 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (forfeiture of property used in connection with illegal
gambling); 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 117(d), 128, 171, 256c, 4081 (forfeiture of guns
and other equipment used unlawfully in national parks); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (for-
feiture of firearms used illegally); 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (forfeiture of property used
in connection with illegal gambling); 18 U.S.C. § 3612 (forfeiture of bribe
monies illegally received by public officials); 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (forfeiture of
property used in connection with liquor violations); 18 U.S.C. § 3617(d) (for-
feiture of vehicles and aircraft seized for a violation of liquor laws); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3618-3619 (forfeiture of conveyances used to introduce intoxicants into In-
dian territories); 19 U.S.C. § 1306 (forfeiture of an unwholesome imported
meat); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1453 & 1492 (forfeiture of property seized in violation of
customs laws); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (forfeiture of adulterated food); 31 U.S.C.§ 490 (forfeiture of funds illegally withheld by public official); 49 U.S.C.§§ 781 & 782 (forfeiture of vessels, vehicles and aircraft used to transport
contraband).
681 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J., dissenting).
18. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683, reh'g denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
19. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1979); Blakey, An Interpretive Analysis, supra note 11, at 950 (1981).
20. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 959 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387,
396 (2d Cir. 1979).
21. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 959 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United
States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Huber, 603
F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979).
1985]
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reason for the change was to take the economic incentives out of
organized criminal activity and to destroy its economic base by in-
cluding divestiture provisions in criminal penalties and civil
remedies.22
Traditionally, because of the history of forfeitures, the abhor-
rence that American society has had for forfeitures, and the draco-
nian results of a forfeiture, the courts have proceeded cautiously in
construing forfeiture provisions. 23 However, in interpreting the
RICO forfeiture provisions in light of the historical background re-
lated herein, the courts have found:
18 U.S.C. section 1963 does not provide a forfeiture of estate
upon conviction of activities proscribed by 18 U.S.C. section
1962. On the contrary, the forfeiture authorized by 18 U.S.C.
section 1963 is extremely narrow: the statute provides for forfei-
ture of an interest acquired or maintained in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, or any interest in, se-
curity of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over an enterprise estab-
lished or operated in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962. Suc-
cinctly, 18 U.S.C. section 1963(a) provides for forfeiture of an
interest in, claim against, or property or contractual right afford-
ing a source of control over a section 1962 enterprise.24
Again, in light of the historical background, the purpose of the
RICO forfeiture provisions is to reach the ill-gotten gains of
criminals when they enter or operate an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.25 "The aim is to divest the association
of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains."' 26 Stated another way, "RICO's
essential aim is to strip violators of the fruits of [their] ill-gotten
gains." 27
The historical analysis set forth herein reveals the following. The
concept of forfeiture is an ancient one dating from a time when
"things" were blamed for crimes, and "things," therefore, could be
taken by the king at the expense of the "thing's" owner.28 The
22. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-85 n.7, 591-92 (1981); United
States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Reme-
dies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1037-38, 1042 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Blakey & Gettings,
Basic Concepts]; Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blakey,
Reflections].
23. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1983).
24. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
25. United States v. Caubel, 706 F.2d 1322, 1346 (5th Cir. 1983).
26. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981); Crocker Bank v. Rockwell
Int'l, 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
27. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984).
28. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 21
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"thing" being the instrumentality of the crime lost its right to exist
and the owner received no compensation for the taking of the object
by the king.29 The concept evolved to the point that whenever a
person committed what was judged to be a criminal act, not only
did he or she suffer punishment directly, but all his or her "things"
were taken by the king.30 Not just the "things" that were instru-
mentalities of the crime taken, but everything owned by the of-
fender was taken, no matter what its origin or its role.31 The
forfeiture was complete because not only did the offender lose his
right to possess the "things," but so did all his heirs.32 The harsh-
ness of this evolution of forfeiture prompted the American colonists
to abolish the concept of forfeiture totally. 33 Gradually, the older
concept of forfeiting the "thing" which was the instrumentality of
the crime crept back into American law, and finally became firmly
established.34 Therefore, if a "thing" was used as an instrumental-
ity of a crime, it could be taken by the government through forfei-
ture proceedings. The evolution of large-scale criminal activity
having large financial rewards for organized criminals and far-
reaching financial impact on society created a need for statutes
which did more than just forfeit or take away those "things" which
were the instrumentalities of the crime.35 Taking away the instru-
mentalities of the crime did nothing to cripple the large criminal
organizations. The seized instrumentality "things" could be, for the
most part, easily replaced. There was a need to take the economic
incentive out of large, organized, financially-rewarding criminal ac-
tivity.36 There was a need to strip the criminal of his ill-gotten gains
and to place him or her in exactly the same economic position he or
she was in prior to commencing the illicit activity.37 RICO has pro-
vided the vehicle for stripping the person who has profited finan-
cially from illicit activity.38
It is suggested that, in light of the historical background and the
purposes for which RICO was created, the word "forfeiture" is not
appropriate in the civil RICO context. RICO does not provide for a
forfeiture in the classical sense of that word.39 Rather, RICO pro-
29. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 23 and infra note 82 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) requires a tracing of the proceeds of illegal activity and
a forfeiture of only those proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) establishes the type of
property that can be reached.
1985]
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vides for the "divesting" of the individual of those "things" which
he or she derived from illicit activity.4 There is no total forfeiture
of estate, and there is no simple forfeiture of the instrumentality of a
crime. Instead, the RICO statutory scheme calls for the weeding
out of all ill-gotten gains. 41
There can be no question that RICO provides that the United
States government, as was the case with the king, can bring an ac-
tion under RICO to divest the convicted criminal of his ill-gotten
gains.42 The question presented in this Article is whether a private
individual hurt by the acts of a civil defendant can, under 18 U.S.C.
section 1964(a), call for the divestiture of the ill-gotten gains of the
defendant and for the distribution of the ill-gotten gains as compen-
sation for the damage caused by the wrongdoer. If there was a for-
feiture to the United States government under 18 U.S.C. section
1963(c), there would be no distribution of the liquidation of the
"things" forfeited to those victims of the illicit activity.43 It is sub-
mitted that 18 U.S.C. section 1964(a) provides a vehicle whereby
those who have been injured by the illicit activity can be compen-
sated through a liquidation of those "things" acquired by the
wrongdoer through his illicit activity, thus, providing a sure remedy
for those injured.44
II. AVAILABILITY OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
18 U.S.C. section 1964 contains two subparagraphs which are rel-
evant to this discussion. Subparagraph (a) provides that the United
States courts may provide various types of equitable relief.45 There
is no restriction stated in that subparagraph concerning who can
apply to the United States court for the relief stated. Subparagraph
(c) provides for a private action awarding the successful plaintiff
treble damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit.46 It is submit-
ted that the combination of subparagraphs (a) and (c) gives any pri-
vate litigant a cause of action for damages and for equitable relief.
There is nothing in the statute itself which refutes this contention.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the United
States District Courts have general equitable powers. In Bell v.
Hood,47 the court stated: "It is . . . well settled that where legal
40. Id.
41. Id.
42, See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982) (criminal forfeiture) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b)
(1982) (civil divestiture).
43. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 119-23.
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 2.
47. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a gen-
eral ight to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any avail-
able remedy to make good the wrong done."'48 In Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park,49 the court stated: "Existence of a statutory right
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies."50
In Cort v. Ash, 51 the Supreme Court enumerated the various factors
necessary to imply equitable relief pursuant to a statutory grant.
Reference to the legislative history of the RICO legislation pro-
vides little or no guidance concerning Congress' intent relative to
who could utilize the relief set forth in section 1964(a). Guidance as
to what Congress was contemplating at the time the RICO legisla-
tion was passed is provided by Professor G. Robert Blakey.5 2 In
two law review articles, Professor Blakey has set forth the history of
the RICO legislation and his views concerning whether equitable
relief under section 1964(a) is available to the private litigant.5 3
Specifically, in addressing the question whether equitable relief is
available to private plaintiffs, Professor Blakey has stated:
Section 1964(a) is a general grant of equitable power. It is not
limited on its face or in its legislative history. Section 1964(b)
grants the government authority to seek relief, and authority that
it was necessary to set lest old learning be used to circumscribe
new governmental power to seek equitable relief. Nothing in sec-
tion 1964(b) speaks in negative terms about an authorization for
private parties to seek similar relief. Indeed, the governmental
suits are to be brought on behalf of private parties. No satisfac-
tory explanation can be offered as to why Congress would have
precluded victims from seeking help themselves. Section
1964(c), moreover, says "sue and" and not "sue to." The con-
trary argument would have to suggest that by adding the right
secured treble damage relief to the general right to sue, Congress
somehow manifested an intention to subtract the right to obtain
other forms of relief. How addition might be converted into sub-
traction in a remedial statute that must be liberally construed
strains even the legal imagination. Section 1964 ought to be read
as authorizing both governmental and private suits to obtain eq-
uitable relief. To the degree that any ambiguity might be
thought to exist in the choice of language, the liberal construc-
48. Id. at 684.
49. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
50. Id. at 239.
51. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
52. Professor of Law, Notre Dame University; Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel
to the United States Senate Subcommittee which drafted Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970. Professor Blakey occupied his position on the Senate Sub-
committee during the time the Subcommittee was considering the RICO legislation
proposals.
53. Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 22, at 1009 n.133 (1980).
Blakey, Reflections, supra note 22, at 237, 244-45, 261-62, 266 n.87, 275 n.115, 276
n.117, 330-41 (1982).
1985]
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tion clause and the remedial purpose of the statute come down
on the side of finding private suits to be authorized and that full
relief can be granted. No satisfactory rationale can be offered, in
short, to explain why a court ought to feel itself circumscribed in
doing full justice for a victim under RICO.5 4
As noted in Professor Blakey's statement above, the RICO legis-
lation specifically calls for a liberal construction in order to effectu-
ate the remedial purposes of the statute. 55
With the clear language of the statute and the indication that
Congress intended that private parties have equitable relief under
Section 1964, the courts have split in their decisions concerning
whether or not equitable relief is available to private litigants under
Section 1964. Equitable relief has been granted in some cases, 56 and
others have held specifically that private equitable relief is not avail-
able to the private litigant.57 Other cases while not passing on the
issue have indicated in dictum there is serious doubt about the avail-
ability of equitable relief for nongovernment civil plaintiffs.5 8
The most persuasive arguments for the granting of equitable re-
lief to private plaintiffs under Section 1964(a) are stated by the
Chambers court as follows:
One very strong argument in favor of such a holding is set
forth in J. Fricano, Civil RICO-An Antitrust Plaintiff's Consid-
erations59. . . . In that article, Mr. Fricano states:
"Strong arguments can be made that Section 1964(a) was
enacted for the benefit of private plaintiffs as well as for the
government. The type of equitable relief authorized by Section
1964(b) is different from the type of equitable relief district
courts are empowered to grant pursuant to Section 1964(a).
Section 1964(b) provides only for temporary injunctive relief,
such as restraining orders. The fact that 1964(b) authorizes
the Attorney General to seek temporary relief is not evidence
54. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 22, at 331-32, 237 (1982).
55. Section 904(a) of Senate Bill 30 as adopted (RICO legislation) states, "This
section provides that the provisions of this title [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942 (1970). See
also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-56 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mc-
Nary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980); Blakey, RICO and the Liberal Construction
Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980).
56. Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D.
Pa. 1984); County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Vietnamese
Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D. W.Va.
1979) (dictum).
57. DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1984); and
Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Il1. 1983).
58. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 718 F.2d 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1983); Dan
River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053
(8th Cir. 1982).
59. Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 361 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Fricano].
[Vol. 21l
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that only the Attorney General is permitted to seek permanent
forms of relief... Indeed, if the availability of injunctive re-
lief were determined by reference to Section 1964(b), rather
than Section 1964(a), Section 1964(a) would be superfluous. A
reasonable construction of Section 1964, therefore, is that both
private litigants and the Attorney General may seek remedies
such as divestiture and, in addition, the Attorney General may
seek temporary restraining orders.". ..60
Another argument in favor of allowing private claimants to
seek equitable relief is that RICO specifically contains a state-
ment of purpose that provides that the act should be liberally
construed to effectuate its purposes. . . .If a private plaintiff
were denied the right to sue for equitable relief, this purpose
would be frustrated. 61
Further support for this finding rests not only in the inter-
pretation of the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. sections
1964(a) and 1964(b), but also in the federal court's inherent
power to grant equitable relief to prevent irreparable injury
from conduct prohibited by RICO. In a few RICO cases,
courts have exercised their inherent equitable powers and
granted injunctive relief to a private claimant.6 2
As we believe the drafts of RICO intended for private claim-
ants, as well as the Government, to benefit from the broader
forms of relief in furtherance of the purposes behind the Act,
we will adopt the holdings of the courts in Icahn and
Vietnamese Fishermen's Association, as well as Mr. Fricano's
well-reasoned arguments, and thus hold that private claimants
in RICO cases may see equitable relief. As such, we will deny
the defendants' motion that Chambers' claim for equitable re-
lief be stricken. 63
Of course, a way around the debate over whether equitable reme-
dies are available to the private plaintiff under section 1964 is to
invoke the general equitable powers of the district court.64 Also,
Professor Blakey, in an extensive footnote, makes the case for equi-
table relief under various provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.65 Unfortunately, it does not appear that divestiture is
60. Chambers, 590 F. Supp. at 1540 (quoting Fricano, supra note 59, at 375).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1540-41 (citations omitted).
63. Chambers, 590 F. Supp. at 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984). See also AETNA Casu-
alty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910-911 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
64. A good example of how this was done can be found in USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982), wherein a private plaintiff brought
a § 1964(c) complaint and in a separate cause of action requested an injunction. The
court upheld the district court's issuing of an injunction by noting that the injunction
was not requested "for the purpose of securing a potential trebled damage award under
RICO." 689 F.2d at 96. The court noted that the injunction was issued upon the find-
ing that the plaintiffs would ultimately prevail on a claim based on common law breach
of a fiduciary duty. Id.
65. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 22, at 237, 334 n.217 (1982).
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one of the equitable remedies which are provided for in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Professor Blakey in the follow-
ing footnote found in the same law review article does make an ar-
gument for the imposition of a constructive trust,66 which is a
remedy very similar to divestiture.
III. ANTITRUST CASES DEALING WITH DIVESTITURE
QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE
QUESTION
The legislative history of the RICO statutes indicates that they
were based in large part upon the federal antitrust statutes. Critics
of the above-stated analysis would point to the fact that the courts
have held under the antitrust statutes, that divestiture is not avail-
able to the private plaintiff.67
The ambiguity in the antitrust statutes which these cases attempt
to resolve is different from any ambiguity in the RICO statute. The
antitrust statute, Clayton Act section 16,68 expressly provides for
private injunctive relief and the issue raised in the cases is whether
divestiture is a form of injunctive relief.69 On the other hand, the
RICO statute expressly provides for divestiture in 18 U.S.C. section
1964(a), but does not expressly state whether it is available to a
private party.70 Therefore, although the question underlying both
statutes is whether divestiture is available to a private plaintiff, the
respective answers in the cases are based on unrelated analyses.
The antitrust statutes are concerned with preventing economic
concentration by keeping a large number of small competitors in
business; the Sherman Act was directed at realized monopolies; and
the Clayton Act at business activities which could lead to monop-
oly-anticompetitive mergers, for example.71
RICO, on the other hand, attempts to eradicate organized
crime's infiltration of business completely, whether monopolistic or
not, and so is concerned with a much broader range of activities. It
is directed toward the protection of existing businesses engaged in
66. Id. at 340 n.218.
67. Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Calnetics
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976); International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) But see NBO
Indus. Treadway Co., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975); Fuchs
Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) states in pertinent part: "The district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent the restrain violations of section 1962 of
this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any
person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise ..
71. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies § 120 (1971).
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interstate commerce from infiltration by elements of organized
crime, from being used as vehicles for laundering the proceeds of
organized criminal activities, and from being perverted to methods
of operation commonly associated with organized crime.72
When proposals for RICO legislation were being considered by
Congress, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association
considered how the existing antitrust legislation scheme might be
used in a RICO context. The American Bar Association president,
Edward L. Wright, said that since experience had shown that suits
by private plaintiffs had become an important avenue of enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, the adoption of as many of the proce-
dures used in the antitrust field as possible in RICO might be a
profitable course of action.73
The ABA Report to Congress voiced concerns about the possibil-
ity that antitrust statutes would be overly restrictive on RICO ac-
tions. It noted that there might be certain racketeering influenced
conduct which Congress would like to proscribe which could not be
reached under the antitrust statutes; in effect, not monopolistic
business practices, but some other undesirable business practice,
such as laundering racketeering profits. While acknowledging that
antitrust remedies might be useful to RICO, it recommended that
the legislation be placed in a separate statute to avoid a "commin-
gling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating
competition." 74 One aspect of commingling that concerned the
ABA was the "body of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust
contest-setting strict requirements on questions such as 'standing
to sue' and 'proximate cause.' "-5
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton,76 the court
commented on the legislative history as follows:
The conclusions that flow from this survey of the legislative his-
tory are unavoidable. Certainly Section 1964(c) was modeled af-
ter Section 4 of the Clayton Act. It was, however, cast as a
separate statute intentionally to avoid the restrictive precedent of
antitrust jurisprudence. . . . Further, the equitable remedies ap-
plied in the antitrust area have always been available to the Court.
Therefore, to burden RICO with restrictive antitrust precedent
would be contrary to the express legislative history.77
Senator McClellan, the bill's sponsor, during the time the pro-
posed legislation was being reviewed by Congress, said:
72. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
73. S. REP. No. 92-1070, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
74. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6994-95 (1969).
75. Id.
76. 540 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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The many references to antitrust cases are necessary because the
particular equitable remedies desired have been brought to their
greatest development in thisfield, and in many instances, they are
the primary precedents for the remedies in the bill. Nor do I
mean to limit the remedies available to those which have already
been established. The ability of our chancery courts to formulate
a remedy to fit the wrong is one of the great benefits of our sys-
tem of justice. This ability is not hindered by the bill.78
Senator Hruska, another chief proponent of the Bill, also appar-
ently contemplated giving courts as broad a remedial power as pos-
sible under RICO. He said he considered the civil remedies of the
Bill its most important feature and added:
I believe that the time has arrived for innovation in the organized
crime fight. The bill is innovative in the sense that it vitalizes
procedures which have been tried and proven in the antitrust
field and applies them into the organized crime field where they
have been seldom used before. Hopefully, experts on organized
crime will be able to conceive of additional applications of the
law. The potential is great.79
The sponsors of the bill and the ABA Antitrust Section all sup-
ported a policy of allowing at least as broad, if not a broader range
of remedies under RICO as under the antitrust laws:
[Section 1964] provides civil remedies for violation of section
1962. Subsection (a) contains broad provisions to allow for re-
form or corrupted organizations. Although certain remedies are
set out, the list is not meant to be exhaustive, and the only limit
on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing
the corrupting influence and make due provisions for the rights
of innocent persons.80
In United States v. Du Pont & Co.,81 an antitrust suit brought by
the Government, Justice Brennan said: "Divestiture has been
called the most important remedy of the antitrust law. It is simple,
relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the
forefront of a court's mind when a violation of section 7 [Clayton
Act] has been found."
If an equitable remedy had been readily available to private plain-
tiffs in the antitrust cases, it would not be consistent with the com-
ments of Senators McClellan or Hruska to argue that Congress
intended to provide for fewer available remedies in RICO than in
the antitrust laws. Since Congress intended to provide "enhanced
remedies" to combat organized crime, the only logical reading of
78. S.1861 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Ruc. 9567 (1969) (emphasis added).
79. S.1861 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6993-94 (1969).
80. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007.
81. 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961).
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the RICO statute must be that congress expanded the private reme-
dies available from the mere "injunctive relief' provided in the anti-
trust statute to divestiture, injunction, dissolution, or
reorganization, as provided in 18 U.S.C. section 1964(a).82
Additionally, in a RICO context, divestiture may be a more cru-
cial remedy than in the antitrust context. While in antitrust cases,
injunctions prohibiting mergers or acquisitions might be sufficient
to redress problems of decreased competition short of outright mo-
nopoly, in a RICO context, divestiture is virtually the only remedy
appropriate to affectuate the goals of the act.8 3 RICO, while devel-
oped from the antitrust statutes, has broader goals. The stated pur-
pose of the statute is to eradicate organized crime by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful ac-
tivities of organized crime.84 RICO was put in a separate statute
outside the antitrust laws in order to avoid restricting it by the body
of precedent found in the antitrust law.85 Therefore, while private
divestiture may not be an appropriate remedy under the antitrust
laws, it is necessary to look further to see if divestiture may, never-
theless, be appropriate under the RICO statutes. It follows that the
courts should not feel bound by the precedent developed under the
antitrust statute, but should begin to develop a new body of law
which addresses the particular situations covered by the RICO
statute.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DIVESTITURE
A. Reliance on Government Forfeitures is Misplaced
As noted above, one of the aims of the RICO legislation is to
divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.86 If the
divestiture cannot be required by the private plaintiff, one has to ask
how the divestiture will be accomplished. It is suggested that it is
speculative to depend upon the United States government to affect a
divestiture and distribute the proceeds to the victims of the crime.
The United States government does not have to request an extensive
forfeiture under the provisions of Section 1963(a), and the courts
may not have to cause a forfeiture under 1963(a) even if one is initi-
ated by the government. 87 The reasons the United States govern-
ment would not request an extensive forfeiture are probably legion,
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981). But see United
States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 383, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
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but the primary reason has to be the difficulty of tracing the ill-
gotten gains into various locations. No small amount of litigation
has been generated by the disputes between the United States gov-
ernment and persons convicted under RICO as to what assets are
forfeitable under Section 1963(a). 88
Moreover, victims would then be at the mercy of the United
States government when it came to determining what assets would
be forfeited under Section 1963(a). Although the forfeiture under
Section 1963(a), once initiated, is possibly mandatory, the civil di-
vestiture provisions under section 1964(a) are not. 89 There is noth-
ing which compels the United States government to initiate a civil
divestiture suit or the court to grant such.90 Therefore, the victims
could never depend upon the United States government to initiate
such a civil suit to recompense them for the damages caused by the
defendant, or the court to award such a divestiture.
Furthermore, one has to inquire what happens to the proceeds of
a forfeiture if such a proceeding is initiated by the government.
There is nothing under the law which provides that once the pro-
ceeds of the racketeering activity have been forfeited to the United
States, those proceeds will then be distributed to the victims of the
criminal activity, even though Section 1963(c) provides for making
"due provision for the right of innocent persons." To the contrary,
when a forfeiture is accomplished, all of the assets immediately go
to the United States and become the property of the United States.
The only possible way that third party victims could obtain relief
through a distribution of the proceeds would be for those third par-
ties to initiate a petition in remission, which petition must be passed
upon by the Attorney General of the United States.91 If the Attor-
ney General chooses not to grant the petition for remission, the as-
sets remain forfeited and the victims are severely limited in their
remedies to force a remission. 92
88. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mc-
Nary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1979).
89. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) (1982) merely states that: "The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962. . ....
Id. (emphasis added); the statute does not require divestiture.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) states, in pertinent part: "The Attorney General may in-
stitute proceedings under this section." Id. (emphasis added).
91. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812-13 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 615
F.2d 383, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); and United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp.
189, 191 (D. Md. 1981). See also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1346 (5th Cir.
1983).
92. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981).
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B. Civil RICO is a Special Statute for Special Situations and
Divestiture Fulfills the Purpose of the Statute
RICO is not a garden-variety statute. Thus, RICO cases should
be reserved for serious matters involving significant harm to the
complainant rather than bringing RICO charges in every federal
civil action involving two or more underlying RICO violations.
Without limiting RICO actions, the statute is unnecessary. Un-
derlying civil "acts" used to form the required "pattern of racke-
teering activity" can be mail fraud or wire fraud charges. 93 Most
state court remedies for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
charges can be applied by these courts and provide the plaintiff suf-
ficient relief, and in many instances abundant relief far in excess of
the RICO provision where punitive damages in addition to actual
damages are pleaded and proved.94 Therefore, RICO must provide
some additional reason for being in place as a form of relief.
A RICO case would be useful in a scenario in which a defendant
has through a pattern of mail fraud violations taken in money from
investors over a period of time. This money, through a variety of
manipulations, has been diverted from the stated purpose of the in-
vestment into a number of non disclosed or misrepresented projects
or accounts or capital goods. 95 In fact, the defendant may have
actually used the fraudulently acquired funds in an investment
scheme where the equity has grown but has not been returned to
investors as originally promised; or, the invested funds have simply
been diverted or converted by the defendant. If all plaintiffs band
together and bring a RICO action, without divestiture they are lim-
ited to treble damage awards. The defendant could retain a signifi-
cant portion of the ill-gotten gain either by cleverly hiding the assets
or by prudent investment of funds over and above any treble dam-
age exposure. In effect, the defendant who is immune from civil
divestiture is being encouraged to acquire funds through any of the
underlying RICO acts and hide these assets or make prudent invest-
ments over and above the treble damage exposure. This lack of ef-
93. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B) (1979).
94. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1983) reads in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plain-
tiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or conceal-
ment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part
of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or
otherwise causing injury.
95. For example, expensive vehicles, Lear jets, villas, jewelry, and the like.
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fective remedy for the investors contradicts a fundamental RICO
purpose which, as stated in the legislative history, is intended to
place the violator back to his financial status quo prior to the com-
mission of the RICO violations. 96 Simply stated, the perpetrator is
not supposed to benefit from taking the risk of acquiring funds in
violation of RICO nor is he supposed to retain any funds acquired
by taking such a risk. Moreover, the economic analysis in the legis-
lative history points to a Congressional desire to protect the legiti-
mate business person who is competing for investment funds with
the RICO violator by taking the incentive out of chancing a RICO
violation.97
In the common investment fraud scenario, the RICO violator
who acquires significant capital investment funds through a pattern
of racketeering activity can drain legitimate community funds away
from the legitimate investment community, rely on a limit in expo-
sure of treble damages among those who actually sue, and thus re-
tain any invested funds or gains in excess of the limit. A reading of
the RICO remedies without divestiture seems to contradict the leg-
islative intent of protecting the legitimate competitor to the RICO
violator under the capitalistic economic system.98
C. Properly Controlled, RICO Divestiture in Civil Cases Works
No More a Burden on Defendants Than Other Remedies
Commonly Used in All Courts
The tactics employed by plaintiff in a civil RICO action demon-
strate that divestiture would not work a harsh or unfair burden on
the defendant when compared to other remedies commonly used in
civil litigation in state and federal courts. Moreover, as close analy-
sis will demonstrate, the divestiture remedy provides a reason for
the RICO statute being apart from the other remedies available to
plaintiff which are, without divestiture, not exceptional.
Does a claim of divestiture work an unreasonable hardship upon
the defendant? It is suggested the answer is "no" because several
present remedies available to victims work the same type of hard-
ship with the full approval of the courts. One should consider at-
tachments, foreclosures, mechanic's liens, receiverships and
involuntary bankruptcy filings. 99
Under the provisions of Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil
96. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 80.
98. See supra notes 37-38, 54 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 481.100-225 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1985)
(attachments); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 725a-729.010 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1985)
(foreclosures); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3109-3154 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1985); 18 U.S.C.
303 (1982) (involuntary bankruptcy).
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Procedure, state court attachment procedure and process controls
in federal actions filed in District Courts. 100 The mechanics of pre-
judgment attachments are possibly more severe than a RICO di-
vestiture since the attachment applies to all property which is held
until judgment and then is liquidated to pay the judgment. The
divestiture remedy found in RICO only applies to property that has
been acquired with the proceeds of the illicit activity 10 1
A common situation with real estate foreclosure actions and
counter-claims readily demonstrates how courts have protected par-
ties seeking return of property through judicial foreclosure. Sup-
pose plaintiff sells a building to defendant and carries back a note
for a portion of the purchase price secured by a deed of trust. After
the sale defendant does not pay on the note and plaintiff seeks fore-
closure. Defendant then files an action claiming fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation by plaintiff in the sale.102 When the parties ap-
pear in court, the judge must decide whether to permit the foreclo-
sure to continue and thereby deprive the defendant of this property
even though defendant may well have linked the alleged fraud to his
inability to pay on the note, or, to hold the foreclosure in abeyance
and thereby deprive plaintiff of his property for the duration of the
litigation. Commonly, the courts have been requiring a bond for
the value of the lost income, and sometimes, for the value of the
property as well, for the duration of the litigation. 0 3 Often the cost
of this bond is such that the defendant is precluded from holding
the subject property during the law suit, and the foreclosure, a tech-
nical and speedy action, is allowed to proceed. There is a more
harsh result in the above example than in a RICO divestiture since
prior to trial the divested property is merely removed from the con-
trol and possible dissipation or sequestering, of the defendant. Final
separation of the defendant from ownership occurs after a full trial
on the merits.
Similarly, mechanics liens offer a method of tying up a property
simply upon the filing of a claim for money owed.'°4 If, for exam-
100. Granny Goose Foods Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 437 n.19 (1974); Diane
Holly Corp. v. Bruno & Stillman Yacht Co., 559 F. Supp. 559, 560 (D.N.H. 1983); and
Ashland Oil Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982): provides that, upon a violation of section 1962, the
district courts may order a "person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect,
in any enterprise."
102. For example, nondisclosure of a material defect known to plaintiff or inten-
tional misrepresentation of a material defect.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 64 (1974) allows for all state court remedies.
104. FED. R. CIv. P. 64 (1974) again, allows for all state court remedies. In the only
reported case on the topic, a question was raised whether a mechanic's lien foreclosure
is within the ambit of Rule 64. Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. North Perry Baptist
Church of Pontiac, 590 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1979). It is submitted that a case should be
confined to its facts.
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pie, a workman performs services upon a piece of property and is
not paid, he can under certain situations, file a mechanic's lien. The
lien encumbers the property for the duration of the litigation and
until the judgment is discharged or when the lien is not foreclosed
on.' 05 Defendant, the owner of the property, is placed in the posi-
tion of being unable to fully utilize the property until the lien is
removed or until a bond is posted to secure the lien.10 6 Prior to any
court determination of liability, property under this system is en-
cumbered and effectively taken from the owner's total control for
the pendency of the litigation to protect the plaintiff should the
claim prove successful. If the lien is foreclosed the owner loses the
property at sale in order to satisfy the amount of the lien.107
Receivers are provided for under state and federal law.'0 8 Ap-
pointment of a receiver is proper to preserve property pending final
determination of its disposition in supplemental proceedings in and
of execution. 0 9
Like receivership, the filing of an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy petition' 10 acts to totally deprive an individual or
business of any meaningful control over his or its assets. Complete
liquidation"' divests the individual or business of the assets and
turns over the fruits of the divestiture to creditors.
In most fraud actions, except certain contract related situations,
punitive damages are permitted and are increasingly sought as a
remedy. Many of the underlying RICO acts are similar to fact pat-
terns and violations used to prove punitive actions in state court
actions or federal actions wherein pendant state claims are litigated.
While RICO damages without divestiture are capped at treble dam-
ages for serious violations, a similar set of facts pleaded in non-
RICO causes of action would permit an award of punitive damages
with limited relation to actual damages. Thus, defendant's claim
that divestiture exposes him to harsh or unjust remedies should not
be well taken since punitive damages for the same actions can easily
extend far beyond the ill-gotten gain by which divestiture is limited.
105. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3144, 3147 (Deering 1983) which provide that the
lien remains in force for two years, but if the lien is not foreclosed within two years it is
null and void.
106. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3143 (Deering 1983).
107. Summaries of California mechanic's lien law are found in 2 WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA PROCEDURE § 139 (2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1983) and CALIFORNIA MECHANIC'S
LIENS AND OTHER REMEDIES (1972 & Supp. 1982).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 66 (1974) sets forth the federal law for receivership estate
administration.
109. Haase v. Chapman, 308 F. Supp. 399, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (West 1984).
111. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for complete liquidation.
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D. Conclusion
Divestiture is therefore the only civil remedy that assures that the
defendant who violates the RICO statute does not unjustly benefit
from his actions."12
Divestiture fulfills the statutory intent and legislative history
which mandate that the incentive to divert funds from the free-en-
terprise capitalistic system into RICO schemes be ended. 113
Divestiture protects the competitor of the violator who is work-
ing within the legal system to make his business successful by taking
the ill-gotten gain away from the violator in its entirety and putting
it back into legitimate channels of commerce. 114
Divestiture assures victims of the RICO violator of the availabil-
ity of assets if they are successful in litigation and further provides
the incentive to seek redress from the violator.' 15
Divestiture does not work injustice on the defendant charged
with a RICO violation since other court approved remedies are as
harsh or harsher. Also, abuse of process and malicious prosecution
tools limit the motivation to frivolously bring such claims and as-
sure the preservation of the assets in question.1 16
V. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RICO DIVESTITURE
As noted above, the courts are loathe to order divestiture because
of the harsh history of forfeitures. If individual or small groups of
plaintiffs were to request divestiture under section 1964(a), the
courts probably would continue to express loathing of the remedy
and deny the requested relief as the courts did in the Kaushal and
DeMent cases.1 17 It is suggested that the real value of divestiture,
and therefore the key to obtaining such relief from the courts, is in
cases involving large groups of investors or victims.
Consider the hypothetical situation posed at the beginning of this
Article.1 18 Two methods of attacking the culpable individual come
to mind which could be combined with RICO civil suits and divesti-
ture to obtain the maximum relief possible.
First, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a
class action could be brought in the name of a group of investors
112. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 37-38, 54, 63, 79 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 391-391.6 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1985);
see also 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 242-70 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
117. See supra note 57.
118. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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who represent all those "similarly situated."'1 19 A RICO divestiture
cause of action could be pled to require the culpable individual or
individuals to turn over to the plaintiff class all the assets acquired
through the pattern of racketeering activity. Thereafter, the repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff class could cause the liquidation of the
assets and the distribution of the proceeds of the liquidation to the
victim investors. It is submitted that such a divestiture order would
bring a quick resolution to the question of how to collect the large
class action judgment if the culpable individual or individuals were
not willing to pay the judgment voluntarily.
An alternative to the class action lawsuit would be the filing of an
involuntary bankruptcy petition under Title 11 of the United States
Code.120 The filing of the petition would bring various assets of the
"estate" under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 121 To reach
those assets not under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as a
result of the operation of Title 11, a bankruptcy trustee could file a
RICO complaint against various culpable individuals who have
drained assets off for their personal benefit requesting a divestiture
of those assets back to the estate. 122 Upon receipt of the assets, the
trustee could liquidate them under the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, and thereafter cause a distribution of the proceeds of the liq-
uidation to the creditor/investors. 123
Under the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code, attorneys can be paid for their
efforts on behalf of the group of investors by application to the
court for the payments of fees and costs.' 24
Suppose, however, that only a limited number of plaintiffs filed a
RICO action seeking divestiture. Would not these "chosen few" be
unjustly enriched at the expense of the other investors who did not
file at the same time and perhaps secured verdicts after this first
group? While there may be some risk here of competing claims
among the injured parties, it is suggested that once a plaintiff files
an action seeking divestiture, the court could appoint a special
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1974).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (West 1984).
121. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 541(a)(1) (West 1984).
122. Such an action would prevent the invocation of the statute of limitations and
other technical aspects of the preference action (11 U.S.C. § 547 (West 1984)) and
fraudulent transfers actions (11 U.S.C. § 544 (West 1984)) of the Bankruptcy Code.
123. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1123(b)(4) (West 1984).
124. Rule 23 attorneys' fee cases allow the payment of attorneys' fees to successful
representatives of the plaintiff class as a cost of litigation. See generally J. MOORE, J.
LucAs & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.91 (2d ed. 1984). Attorneys'
fees are provided for in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 503-04
(West 1984). Also, attorneys rendering a benefit to the bankruptcy estate can be com-
pensated out of the estate. Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533 (1903); 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 330.05[d] (15th ed. 1984).
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master or trustee similar to a trustee in a bankruptcy action who
would oversee and preserve the divested property for the benefit of
any injured party or potentially successful plaintiff.
Upon filing a civil RICO case, plaintiffs would, with divestiture
available to them as a remedy, allege specific items of property, ac-
counts, and other items that they would be required to demonstrate
at trial were acquired with ill-gotten gain or through a pattern of
racketeering activity. As in a criminal action seeking forfeiture,
tracing of assets would be required at trial to substantiate these
claims.
At the conclusion of all litigation the subject property would then
either be returned intact to the defendant or divided among the suc-
cessful plaintiffs based upon their demonstrated loss in the RICO
litigation. This remedy and procedure is consistent with the legisla-
tive intent of depriving the defendant of the "ill-gotten gain" in or-
der to take the incentive out of RICO violations.125
CONCLUSION
RICO was passed to address a perceived problem in the economy
of the United States. The pervasive influence of organized crime in
the economy dictated the need for strong remedies to cure the dis-
ease. Without question the United States Government can cause a
person or business to divest himself or itself of ill-gotten gains, 126
and thereby fulfill the purposes of the RICO statutes.
The purposes of the statute will also be fulfilled if the private
litigant is given the ability to cause the same type of divestiture.
Section 1964(a) provides such a vehicle.
125. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982) provides: "The Attorney General may institute
proceedings under this section."
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